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Berlin: East German Foreign Trade Minister Rau publicly warned West Germany on 6 September against curtailing trade with East Germany in reprisal for Communist pressures on West Berlin, and rejected Bonn's contention that inter-German trade is contingent on unhampered communications with West Berlin. Rau asserted that retaliatory measures by West Germany "will only hasten the measures needed to make West Berlin a free city." West Berlin officials fear that the East Germans may impose new travel restrictions this coming week end in connection with the West Berlin Industrial Fair and the visit of acting Chancellor Erhard. [REDACTED] (Page 1)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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India: The Indian Communist party leadership on 7 September formally reaffirmed its policy of achieving power through "peaceful" means, thus in effect lining up with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. The resolution passed by the Indian party's central executive committee climaxed a bitter debate during recent weeks between pro-Moscow moderates and an extremist "left sectarian" group which has supported Peiping's views on various questions. [REDACTED] The Indian Communist leaders remain deeply divided, but the position of the moderate faction reportedly has been bolstered by indications that even the "left sectarians" now deem it expedient to show some support for the Moscow line. [REDACTED] Almost all of the world's Communist parties which have thus far declared themselves in the Sino-Soviet dispute have sided with Moscow, with none as yet declaring clearly for Peiping. [REDACTED]

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Iran: [The immediate task of the new Iranian Government is to improve relations with the USSR, although nothing will be done in this regard at the expense of Iran's ties with the West, according to Prime Minister Sharif-Emami. The new premier told Ambassador Wailes on 4 September that he intends to approach the problem with firmness, but without the belligerency of his predecessor. He said he hopes to improve trade relations with the USSR and to settle outstanding border problems, but disclaimed any interest in Soviet loans, saying these lead to political involvement.]

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Congo: There is a growing threat of extensive fighting in Leopoldville between the military factions supporting Premier Lumumba and those backing President Kasavubu and other moderate leaders. Kasavubu has so far failed in his attempt to oust Lumumba, and at least one of his moderate supporters in the cabinet--Foreign Minister Bomboko--sought asylum in the American Embassy after learning that pro-Lumumba troops brought up from Thysville were searching for him. Kasavubu's position may be strengthened, however, by the reported arrival in Leopoldville of some of his military adherents, as well as by the release from jail on 6 September of Bangala leader Bolikango by soldiers opposing Lumumba. The Congolese Chamber of Deputies did nothing to clarify the situation on 7 September when it voted that the actions of both Lumumba and Kasavubu in attempting to oust each other were invalid.

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Radio Moscow's criticisms that the UN authorities have interfered in the Congo's internal affairs and failed to support the "lawful government" suggest Soviet support for new moves by Lumumba to modify the UN's status in the Congo. [Ghana, however, is giving greater support to the UN. Nkrumah on 5 September urged another Security Council meeting to give the UN a freer hand in resolving the Congo problem.]

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III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future. 120

- C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:

General Phoumi, fearing for his safety and opposed to Souvanna Phouma's neutralist policies, is refusing to return to Vientiane to assume his government post. Thus, the situation in Laos has not stabilized and may lead to further developments favorable to the Communists.

The increasing support given to the Lumumba forces by the Communist bloc appears designed to undermine the UN position in the Congo and may result in clashes between UN forces and Congolese troops.

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East Germany Threatens Bonn With Reprisals in Berlin Situation

In a press conference held in connection with the Leipzig Fair on 6 September, East German Foreign Trade Minister Heinrich Rau warned Bonn against trying to retaliate against East Germany's intensified restrictions on West German travel to Berlin. "If West Germany takes steps it will only hasten the measures needed to make West Berlin a free city," he declared. Moreover, he denied that continued trade between East and West Germany is contingent on the maintenance of West Berlin's free communications with the West. West German officials say the Ulbricht regime has tacitly accepted this condition since the initial agreement was signed in 1951.

Echoing Rau's remarks, Gerhard Eisler, East Germany's leading propagandist, asserted that "interzonal trade must be kept completely free of politics." These arguments are aimed at West German businessmen, who have been reluctant to take any steps to break off trade.

The East Germans on 2 September began halting German barge traffic with Berlin. On the grounds that shipping with draft in excess of the legal limit was traveling on the Havel canal, 17 barges were forced to return to the border crossing point at Schnackenburg and subjected to long delays. In contrast with past usage, the barges were not permitted for legalistic reasons to take an alternate route to West Berlin.

West Berlin Deputy Mayor Amrehn has expressed fears that new harassments may be attempted on 10 September in connection with the West Berlin Industrial Fair and the visit to West Berlin of Vice Chancellor Erhard. Erhard is to discuss possible economic reprisals with Brandt, who has threatened the East Germans with a "moral boycott" including economic measures if there is any further disturbance of access to the city.

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Situation in the Congo

President Kasavubu's coup attempt against Premier Lumumba thus far has failed to gain popular support or to undermine the premier's political position, although the situation remains fluid. There is a growing threat of violence in the capital city of Leopoldville as military adherents of both men arrive there. Lumumba has retained influence over the police-- on 6 September they fired on pro-Kasavubu demonstrators-- and on 7 September he called in troops from Thysville, apparently in an effort to capture the moderate foreign minister and Kasavubu supporter, Justin Bomboko. Bomboko sought asylum in the American Embassy, an action which may be followed by other moderate Congolese leaders who fear Lumumba's retaliation.

If the UN forces--already providing a protective guard for Senate President Ileo and President Kasavubu at the latter's residence--extend such cover to other Congolese, Premier Lumumba may be sufficiently provoked at UN "interference in internal Congolese affairs" to demand the withdrawal of all UN troops from the Congo. He has already protested UN control of the radio station and airfields. Lumumba on 7 September appealed to the independent African states for immediate military aid--troops, armament, and aircraft for troop transportation--to be given outside of the UN. He had earlier cabled an urgent appeal to Sukarno to place the Indonesian battalions under the control of the central Congo government.

Kasavubu's position seems to be strengthened if reports that some of his military adherents have arrived in Leopoldville and that opposition leader Jean Bolikango has been liberated from prison are substantiated. Bolikango is an influential tribal leader from the northwest Congo, and his Bangala tribesmen comprised 40 percent of the former Force Publique as well as being numerous in the Leopoldville area.

Lumumba's recourse to the National Assembly did not result in any clarification of the situation. The Chamber of

Deputies on 7 September passed a resolution calling invalid the actions of both Kasavubu and Lumumba in attempting to dismiss each other.

Soviet and East European propaganda media have given strong propaganda support for Lumumba in the wake of the attempted coup and have publicly criticized UN authorities for "open interference" in the Congo's internal affairs and for "hampering the establishment of law and order." Such criticisms raise the prospect that Moscow will support Lumumba in new moves aimed at modifying the role and status of UN forces. Previously, Soviet officials had encouraged Lumumba to call for the creation of an observer group comprised of representatives of various African countries which would ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions, but did not press the proposal because of lack of support by Afro-Asian governments.

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Meanwhile, President Nkrumah of Ghana has reiterated in strong terms his support of the UN in its Congo operations. On 5 September, he told the American ambassador in Accra that he was greatly disturbed over events in the Congo. He stated that he had tried to restrain Lumumba, but the Congolese premier had replied that he could expect no direct help from Ghana because Accra was totally committed to the UN. Nkrumah said that something must be done immediately to stop Lumumba's aggressiveness and the Soviet bloc's meddling outside of the UN framework. The President added that he had just drafted a message to Hammarskjold urging another meeting of the Security Council to give the UN a freer hand in resolving the Congo problem.

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